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Abstract Both the number of crime suspects without legal status and the number of
irregular or undocumented immigrants held in detention facilities increased substantially in
theNetherlands between 1997 and 2003. In this period, theDutch state increasingly attempted
to exclude irregular immigrants from the formal labour market and public provisions. At the
same time the registered crime among irregular migrants rose. The ‘marginalisation thesis’
asserts that a larger number of migrants have become involved in crime in response to a
decrease in conventional life chances. Using police and administrative data, the present study
takes four alternative interpretations into consideration based on: 1) reclassification of
immigrant statuses by the state and redefinition of the law, 2) criminal migration and cross-
border crime, 3) changes in policing, and 4) demographic changes. A combination of factors
is found to have caused the rise in crime, but the marginalisation thesis still accounts for at
least 28%. These findings accentuate the need for amore thorough discussion on the intended
and unintended consequences of border control for immigrant crime.
Introduction
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly relying on practices of
internal border control to discourage unwanted migrants from settling without
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government consent [3, 28, 42, 67]. This is true for various EU countries in particular,
where the importance of national borders has diminished as a result of the Schengen
Agreement, and national governments have begun to look for alternatives to control
unwanted immigration [11]. There has also been an expansion of migration control
‘to the inside’ in the US, both at the federal level and, especially since 2005, at the
state level [63]. Internal border control takes place within state territory and can be
distinguished from external border control (patrolling of territorial borders, visa
systems).There are two main types of internal control [37]. The first type is aimed
at excluding illegally residing or undocumented immigrants (hereafter: irregular
immigrants) from the welfare state’s key institutions, such as the formal labour
market, social security benefits, public education, the formal housing market, and
health care. The second type pertains to all practices aimed at tracing and expelling
irregular immigrants who have settled in the state territory. This article focuses on the
first type of internal border control.
The Netherlands was among the first countries to gradually build up a systematic
policy of excluding irregular immigrants from the labour market and public provi-
sions [59]. During the 1960s, when demand for low-skilled labour was high, the
Dutch state showed considerable leniency in admitting irregular immigrants, who
could quite easily obtain a residence permit after having found employment. After the
early 1970s, the policy discourse became more restrictive, but in practice it remained
fairly easy for irregular immigrants to acquire social security numbers and find tax-
paying jobs in certain sectors. In the early 1990s, irregular residence came to be seen
as a pressing social problem requiring firmer state intervention. At the time, the
problem was mostly framed in socio-economic terms. Illegal residence was believed
to be a threat to the welfare state, which had come under much financial pressure in
the 1980s, and the diminishing border controls within the Schengen area aggravated
these concerns.1 In 1991, the government barred the use of social security numbers
for irregular immigrants, which severely limited their opportunities to work in the
formal labour market [60]. Later, in 1998, the ‘Linking Act’ was implemented, which
excluded irregular immigrants from a wide array of public services, including wel-
fare, public housing, education, and (most) health care. It was made obligatory for
government and semi-government services, such as welfare departments and housing
associations, to check whether their clients are lawful residents and hence are entitled
to certain services or benefits [50, 57]. Finally, the national government increasingly
allocated resources to enforce employer sanctions on employers who hire irregular
immigrants informally.2 In recent years, i.e. after the period that is central in this
article, the Dutch government has taken many more steps to exclude irregular
immigrants, and has laid more emphasis on the second type of internal control, i.e.
at tracing and attempting to expel irregular immigrants.
One of the aims of the increase in internal border control was to discourage
irregular residence. Yet, there are no indications that the policies mentioned have
led to a substantial decrease in irregular residence in the Netherlands. Until 2003, the
1 In the literature the term ‘internal border control’ is sometimes used to refer to external border control of
countries within the Schengen area. It should be noted that in this article the term is used differently.
2 Between 1997 and 2003 the annual budget of the Labour Inspectorate, the responsible body which falls
under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, has risen by almost 50%. Expenditures increased
from € 39 million to €56 million [35, 36].
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estimated number of irregular immigrants fluctuated between 150,000 and 200,000,
or about 1% of the total population [41]. If a trend can be discerned for this period, it
appears to be upwards rather than downwards. It was only after the EU expansion in
2004 that irregular residence diminished to about 130,000, mostly because immi-
grants from various new member states could now come to stay in a legal manner
[59].
Simultaneously, the period 1997 to 2003 was marked by an increase in the number
of crime suspects and detainees without legal status. In 1997, 31% of all apprehen-
sions by the police and controlling agencies involving irregular immigrants were
related to crime rather than to immigration offences or misdemeanours [41]. By April
2004 this share had increased to 49% [8]. Furthermore, between 1997 and 2004 the
number of irregular immigrants held in administrative detention (awaiting expulsion)
rose by 92%, and the number of foreigners held in Dutch prisons increased by 49%
[39].3 The latter increase was caused by several factors which are not all discussed
here, but the rise in crime suspects without legal status is likely to be among them.
Irregular immigrants have elevated detention chances in case of police contacts, and
tend to be detained in immigration detention in case of relatively minor crimes that
are normally punished with a fine or a Community Punishment Order [61].
There are reasons to believe that the increase in internal border control and the rise
in crime are related. Dutch research since the mid-1990s has continuously found that
irregular immigrants risk being pushed towards subsistence crime and drug-related
crime if they find themselves in a highly marginal social position. The intensification
of internal border control may have resulted in a higher prevalence of these types of
crime, because more irregular immigrants risk ending up in such a highly marginal
position if they stay in the country.
This marginalisation thesis—the idea that social marginalisation may press irreg-
ular immigrants to crime–is based on qualitative studies and cross-sectional quanti-
tative studies [23, 24]. In order to make a stronger claim of causality, however,
alternative explanations for the rise in crime should be taken into consideration and
should be controlled for. This is the aim of the present article. The alternative
explanations are taken from the literature and from public debates on irregular
migration.
With a broader theoretical perspective and stronger empirical basis, this article
aims to contribute to the literature on the intended and unintended effects of border
control in two main ways. Firstly, it shows that internal border control, like all
policies attempting to curb irregular migration, may have side effects or even perverse
effects. So far, most of these consequences, such as the rise in human smuggling, are
primarily discussed in relation to external border control [13, 14, 16, 52]. Secondly,
we demonstrate that practices of internal control may have consequences for migrant
behaviour. There is a substantial literature on the ‘securitisation of migration’, which
analyses how and why political entrepreneurs, security organisations and the media
portray certain migration flows as a security threat [4–7, 31, 32]. This literature tends
3 On 30 September 1997 there were 6,105 foreign-born prisoners; on 30 September 2004 9,125. This
increase had several causes, such as the increased repression of drug trafficking. The number of persons in
Aliens’ Detention, however, almost doubled in this period: on September 30, 1997, 425 persons were in
Aliens’ Detention, on 30 September 2004, 1,655. Source: CBS Statline (http:/statline.cbs.nl), visited April
2009.
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to focus on the ways in which migrants and migration have come to be constructed as
criminal by the law, or are treated as criminal by law enforcement agencies. For
example, as Huysmans has claimed: “Once turned into a security problem, the
migrant appears as the other who has entered (or who desires to enter) a harmonious
world and just by having entered it, has disturbed the harmony”[31: 59]. Likewise
Stumpf, in her discussion of what she calls ‘crimmigration’, has shown that migration
policy and criminal law have increasingly merged in the United States: “Immigration
violations previously handled as civil matters are increasingly addressed as criminal
offenses” [54: 12]. Although we agree that such social constructions may certainly
contribute to an–if only ‘nominal’–association between immigration and crime, our
main concern here is that practices of internal border control may have consequences
for the real involvement of irregular migrants in common crimes, such as theft and
drug dealing, the definition of which has not changed in recent years. More generally,
we aim to contribute to key debates in the study of immigration and crime by arguing
that policies of border control should be taken into consideration when explaining
immigrant crime. From a policy perspective this article sheds light on the complex-
ities of controlling immigration and immigrant crime through internal controls.
The analyses are based on a data set containing all irregular immigrants who were
apprehended by all relevant authorities in the Netherlands between January 1997 and
October 2003. This period was taken because 1997 is the first year and 2003 the most
recent year for which national police data have been made available for scientific
research so far. As described above, measures of internal border control were partly
introduced in this period, or in the years just before it. Additionally, these data were
combined with administrative data on all non-citizens who have lost their residence
permit because of crimes. Finally, the data were compared to police figures on crime
suspects with legal status.
The following section discusses the five central explanations of the present study.
After introducing the data sources and research methods, the findings will be presented.
The concluding section elaborates on the study’s theoretical and policy implications.
Five possible explanations of the rise in crime
The marginalisation thesis
Irregular migration and crime are often conflated in popular imagination [29, 46]. On
the whole, it can nonetheless be hypothesised that the involvement of irregular
immigrants in crime is actually inhibited by their precarious societal position, in
which detention and deportation are inherent risks. Particularly the findings of the
early Dutch studies on irregular residence and crime supported this ‘deterrence
thesis’: most irregular immigrants were found to refrain from criminal activities,
and the involvement of irregular immigrants in expressive crimes, such as violence
and vandalism, was found to be limited [37].
At the same time, there are indications that the crimes irregular immigrants commit
are often a response to a marginal social position. The marginalisation thesis is based
on empirical findings in a series of studies conducted in the Netherlands, briefly
described below.
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First, substantial differences in criminal involvement were found across ethnic
groups. In the early 1990s 4% of irregular Turkish immigrants had come into contact
with the Rotterdam police because of criminal activity. For Eastern Europeans,
Algerians and Moroccans these percentages were 32, 54 and 65, respectively [22].
On the basis of qualitative fieldwork, this variation was attributed to ethnic differ-
ences in social ties and social capital. Many irregular immigrants from Turkey were
supported by well-established Turks who moderated the consequences of internal
border control by increasing access to formal institutions in informal ways, for
instance by sharing health insurance cards, as well as to informal institutions, for
instance by arranging informal employment in shops owned by co-nationals. To a
large extent, the irregular migration of Turks had the characteristics of organised
chain migration; many newcomers knew beforehand where they were going to reside
and for whom they would work [53]. Irregular immigrants who were involved in
crime had more often migrated to the Netherlands in improvised ways, and received
less support from established countrymen. Sometimes resourceful communities were
lacking, sometimes ethnic solidarity was weak. These findings were corroborated in
in-depth interviews with 165 irregular immigrants in Rotterdam. Respondents with
families and permanent residence in the Netherlands reported involvement in crime
less frequently than irregular immigrants who lacked kin in the Netherlands and were
often travelling from one address to the other [12].
In addition, in a comprehensive study on asylum migration and crime [20] it was
found that the relative number of crime suspects among failed asylum seekers
residing illegally in the Netherlands was several percent points higher than among
officially recognised asylum seekers and asylum seekers still awaiting the conclusion
of the procedure. And repeated in-depth interviews with 26 rejected asylum seekers
who had become irregular immigrants and were detained in the Aliens Custody for
crimes [37] showed that most men in this study had committed subsistence crime in
order to meet various social standards that they could not, or believed they could not,
realise in conventional ways. Finally, there is the observed rise in documented crime
among irregular immigrants, which was mentioned in the introduction. In sum, there
are indications that deterrence as a consequence of fear for expulsion may increas-
ingly have been outweighed by marginalisation effects. Suggestive evidence for the
notion that irregular residence status depresses criminal involvement unless margin-
alisation reaches a certain threshold can also be found in the scarce studies on
irregular residence and crime that have been conducted in other countries (for the
United States see for instance [29, 45] for Germany [2], for Belgium [62], for Italy
[44]). Alternative explanations are addressed in the next section.
Reclassification and redefinition
The first alternative explanation takes the rise in registered crime as the outcome of
changes in the way the Dutch state classifies certain migrants as ‘irregular immi-
grants’, or changes in the official definition of what constitutes ‘crime’.
Whereas the marginalisation thesis argues that irregular status may lead to crime
involvement, the opposite can also be true: criminal involvement may lead to an
irregular status. Legal immigrants can lose their legal status in case of crime, for
instance when they are declared ‘undesirable aliens’. In the Netherlands this may be
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done when a non-citizen has committed a crime for which three or more years of
imprisonment can be inflicted. Continued residence in the Netherlands then becomes
irregular and punishable as a crime for a period of up to 10 years. A residence permit
may be also be withdrawn or refused, without the immigrant being declared an
undesirable alien in case of deportable crimes that are somewhat less serious, or if
a convict’s family is living in the Netherlands.4 The term ‘status reclassification’ will
be used here for all forms of losing legal status due to criminal activities.
Status reclassification may increase the number of crime suspects with irregular
residence status in two main ways. Firstly, such migrants may re-enter or remain in
the country. If undesirable aliens are arrested they contribute, per definition, to the
total number of crime suspects with irregular residence status. Secondly, it can be
expected that additional offending will be relatively common among legal immigrants
who have lost their legal status because of crimes. Past offending is the best known
predictor of future offending [27].
Over time, status reclassification has become more common in the Netherlands:
between 1997 and 2003 the annual prevalence of status reclassification involving
non-EU citizens almost doubled from 769 to 1,555 cases. In these 7 years 5,580 non-
EU citizens were declared undesirable aliens. One reason for this increase was
the introduction of legislation in 2002 that has made it easier for the Dutch
state to terminate the legal stay of non-citizens who have been convicted of
certain crimes. The most important change is that legally residing migrants now
run the risk of losing their residence permit for less serious crimes, at least in
the case of short residence durations, i.e. up to 5 years. Additionally, the
government has made increased use of the existing legal possibilities to end
residence rights of criminal non-citizens. These developments in status reclas-
sification are in line with Stumpf’s observations about the merging of criminal
law and immigration law: rather than being rehabilitated and re-integrated in
Dutch society, non-citizen criminals are increasingly excluded, both socially and
territorially, with the help of immigration law [54, 58].
Yet definitional changes with regards to what counts as ‘criminal’ cannot be a
major explanation for the rise in the number of crime suspects under study. It was
already in 1994, thus before the research period (1997–2003), that the Netherlands
introduced its Identification Act. This Act, which was expanded in 2005, stipulates
that every person in the Netherlands has to be able to prove his or her identity with an
officially recognised identity document, at least when working, when suspected of a
criminal offence, and in case of a ‘concrete indication’ of illegal residence (in 2001
the latter stipulation was changed to ‘reasonable suspicion’). Showing a false docu-
ment in case of ID checks became punishable as a felony. Not being able to show ID–
being ‘sans papiers’ in stricto sensu–became punishable as a common misdemeanour.
Moreover, at EU level, the 2002 Directive on illegal entry, transit or residence
criminalised assistance to irregular migrants to enter or–if assistance occurs for
financial gain–to reside in EU member states [64]. This resulted in changes to the
4 According to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights migrants legally residing in a
country have a right to maintain a family life there, which conflicts with the implications of a being an
undesirable alien. Migrants who lose their residence permit may still bring short visits to the Netherlands,
but continued settlement is regarded illegal residence.
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Dutch Criminal Law, but these pertained to those offering assistance to irregular
migrants rather than to the migrants themselves.
Criminal migration and cross-border crime
The second alternative explanation attributes the rise in crime to changes in criminal
migration and cross-border crime. Migrants may decide to cross borders in order to
smuggle irregular goods, to seize criminal opportunities in the country of destination,
or to escape criminal prosecution. Also, migrants with no further criminal intentions
after settlement may use false documents to cross the border in response to external
border controls [34]. In the literature the terms criminal migration and cross-border
crime are often used to denote such phenomena. Although there are substantial
differences among these forms of crime, they can all be contrasted with the margin-
alisation thesis: in these cases offending is intended beforehand and is not a response
to internal border control.
Criminal migration and cross-border crime are under-researched in relation to
irregular residence, but their prevalence may have increased in the Netherlands
between 1997 and 2003, albeit for different reasons. On the one hand, it is likely
that the use of false documents upon entry has become increasingly common,
particularly among irregular immigrants who lack social ties in the European Union
and have fewer opportunities to overstay tourist visas [37]. Since the 1980s the list of
countries requiring a visa to enter the EU has been expanded ([7] see also [26]). On
the other hand, external border controls with respect to Eastern Europeans were eased
considerably after the fall of the Iron curtain and the European Union’s Eastern
enlargement. Visa requirements for short visits were already dropped for a number
of countries such as Poland in the early 1990s. In 2001 this was done for the, at the
time, future EU member states Bulgaria and Romania. It appears that the relaxation of
external border controls for Eastern Europeans has facilitated an increase in ‘trans-
national brigandage’, in which Eastern European criminals increasingly started com-
mitting crimes in Western Europe, such as house burglary and car theft [10, 65].
Among them were irregular immigrants [68].
Policing
The third alternative explanation emphasises improved crime detection and crime
recording by the Dutch police. The rise in crime among irregular immigrants may
simply reflect a general trend in criminal law enforcement and registration. Between
1999 and 2002 the police forces were expanded considerably, from 40,000 to 47,000
policemen [48, page127]. The Dutch police have also become more active in
recording crimes in these years [69]. Another possibility is that the police have paid
more attention to immigrant crime between 1997 and 2003: police apprehensions are
often suspected to be selective with respect to migrants [66]. So far, in the Nether-
lands, little evidence has been mustered for the proposition that the police differen-
tially arrest by ‘foreign appearance’ [8, 51]. It must be noted, however, that recent
research is lacking.
An additional possibility is that the police have been giving a higher priority to
detecting and/or the recording of offending by irregular immigrants. In order to
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explain this possibility it is helpful to briefly describe how the policing of irregular
migrants is organised and carried out in the Netherlands.
The Netherlands has a decentralised police organisation. Apart from a relatively
small national police force (FTE was about 4,000 in 2003) and a Military Police force
(FTE 6,000), there are 25 local police forces (FTE: 50,000). Each local police force
has its own Aliens Police department, responsible for maintaining immigration law.
Through the years the regular police conduct about 55% of the apprehensions during
regular policing activities. The Aliens Police are responsible for about a quarter of the
apprehensions, which mostly take place during work site checks, or checks on (the
residential addresses of) migrants who are suspected of having overstayed their visas.
About a fifth is done by the Military Police, who are responsible for external border
control (illegal entry, drug trafficking and so forth).
Irregular migrants who are not involved in crimes are underrepresented in Dutch
police data. This is partly due to legal stipulations that limit the possibilities for the
police to stop persons just to check their residence status: as mentioned in the section
on status reclassification and redefinition, the police must have a ‘concrete indication’
(since 2001: ‘reasonable suspicion’) of illegal residence to ask for ID. However,
policemen’s own pragmatic and moral considerations are probably more important
than legal stipulations. In 1996 and 1997, we interviewed 170 irregular migrants and
41 police officers working for the Police and the Aliens Departments in the cities of
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, and found that the police officers
considered illegal residence a relatively minor infraction, certainly in comparison to
other public safety concerns. [57] Many policemen also recognised that a tougher
‘fight against illegality’ would probably reduce the willingness on the part of the
residents–both unauthorised residents and a larger group of legal migrants in which
the former migrants are embedded–to cooperate with the police, for example by
reporting crime. We encountered some policemen who had developed a special
interest in the tracing of irregular migrants: if such officers observe that persons with
a foreign appearance commit certain minor misdemeanours–of the type that are often
ignored by the police in many Dutch cities, such as bicycle riders riding without lights
or neglecting traffic lights–they may stop the person just to have a legal pretext to ask
for ID (in the Netherlands, the checking of residence status can be done on the beat:
all regular police have access to a national database in which the immigration status
of non-citizens is registered). In most cases, however, we found that the police did not
pay much attention to irregular migrants who did not cause trouble in the neighbour-
hood, targeting crime suspects instead (especially suspects of felonies rather than
minor misdemeanours), regardless of residence status. They usually do not know in
advance whether a crime suspect resides in the country legally or not, which limits the
possibilities for selective policing with respect to legal status.
Field research in later years allowed us to get an impression of any changes in
apprehension practices and priorities. In 2000 we interviewed 156 irregular immi-
grants, and in 2003 and 2004 we again interviewed 65 irregular immigrants, as well
as 45 landlords and 20 professionals (of whom 8 policemen). We found that two main
developments were taking place that may have increased the number of crime
suspects with irregular status. First, there were more efforts to detect identity fraud.
For example, the number of work site checks rose, which will have led to a larger
number of apprehensions for administrative reasons (‘illegal labour’) as well as for
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false documents, as workers are asked to show their ID. Likewise, the Military Police
had begun to deploy more personnel to trace false documents at the border. Second,
the police had to some extent started to specifically target groups of criminal irregular
immigrants. In particular in the Amsterdam area, specialised teams have been formed
since 2002 to arrest irregular immigrants who are believed to be heavily involved in
criminal activities. In the period under study, these teams apprehended approximately
400 (allegedly) criminal irregular immigrants. It has to be noted, however, that not
every apprehension that occurs as a result of increased selectivity will lead to a higher
number of crime suspects. The Amsterdam teams enter apartments or buildings where
groups of criminal migrants are believed to be present, and may not have sufficient
evidence to officially suspect and prosecute the arrestees because of crimes. In some
cases it is easier to register the apprehension under immigration law and deport the
arrestees on administrative grounds.
Demographic changes
Finally, the rise in the number of crime suspects could simply be a side-effect of
developments in the composition of the irregular population, or its size. For instance,
involvement in crime correlates with sex and age. It could be that the share of young
males has grown between 1997 and 2003, or that the number of crime suspects
merely increased proportionally to the size of the irregular population as a whole.
In order to put the marginalisation thesis to a critical test, the alternative explan-
ations were operationalised in ways that put the marginalisation thesis at a disadvan-
tage rather than favouring its corroboration. The data and analytical strategy are
described in more detail in the next section.
Data sources, analytical strategy and validity
Data sources
The data on apprehended irregular immigrants have been provided by the Dutch police
forces and are taken from the national VAS database in which all known irregular
immigrants are documented. Entries include information on nationality, sex, age, arrival
date in the Netherlands, date of apprehension, and the most serious reason for appre-
hension. Between January 1997 and October 2003 107,322 apprehensions were regis-
tered. Of these, 93,030 concerned irregular immigrants from non-EU countries. This
figure includes nationals of countries that have become EU member states after 2003.
As mentioned earlier, most irregular immigrants in the database are apprehended
by the regular police. They are either suspected of crime or common misdemeanours
(such as ignoring traffic lights) or fall into the hands of the police as ‘additional
catch’, for instance when people are asked to show ID during policing activities.
Some irregular immigrants, for instance rejected asylum seekers, have resided legally
in the Netherlands before becoming irregular immigrants. They have to report to the
Aliens Police on a regular basis and may eventually be apprehended and expelled.
Others are apprehended by or handed over to the Aliens Police after border controls,
workplace checks or housing inspections in disadvantaged urban areas.
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Almost 70% of the apprehensions concern males between 20 and 40 years of age,
and they come from countries all over the world. The largest groups come from well-
known source countries for immigration to the Netherlands such as Turkey, Morocco
and Surinam as well as Eastern European countries (for more details on the compo-
sition of the irregular population in the Netherlands see [41, 59]). Approximately
15% are rejected asylum seekers, mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East
and Central Asia.
The Dutch Immigration and Nationalisation Service (IND), a special branch of the
Ministry of Justice, provided us with information on status reclassification. They
listed all persons who have been declared undesirable aliens and/or who lost a
residence permit because of crimes during the period 1997–2003. On the basis of
this data all crime suspects could be identified in the VAS data who may have been
reclassified legal migrants (this was done using the unique ‘foreigner numbers’, an
administrative number for foreigners, which is included in both the VAS and IND
data).
In order to test the policing explanation, statistics on documented crime suspects
among Dutch citizens and legally residing migrants were used. The demographic
explanation was examined with the help of Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s [18]
estimations of the size of the undocumented population, for a discussion see [56].
Analytical strategy
Irregular immigrants can be apprehended for the following reasons: (1) administra-
tive infringements of the Aliens Act–such as irregular residence or working without a
working permit–which are not or only mildly punishable; (2) common misdemean-
ours that are usually punished with a fine, such as fare dodging, driving under the
influence of alcohol, and the like; (3) felonies such as shoplifting, car and house
burglary, vandalism, staying in the country while being an undesirable alien, robbery,
physical assault and several crimes mentioned in the Opium Law, which range from
large-scale drug trafficking to petty dealing or drug possession. This article focuses
on the third category, which represents about one third (36%) of the apprehensions;
administrative infringements and common misdemeanours are generally not regarded
as ‘criminal activities’ in Dutch society.
The apprehensions for felonies were broken down into four types of crime:
‘property crimes’, ‘false documents’, ‘drugs’, and ‘other crimes’.5 The latter category
mainly consists of violence against persons and goods and being in the Netherlands
as an undesirable alien. This categorisation in four types of crime was chosen because
previous research suggested that offending in response to marginalisation usually
concerns subsistence crime and crimes to finance drug use. These are usually
property crimes, possession of false papers (working in the formal economy with
somebody else’s papers), and drug possession and trafficking. On the basis of the
theoretical framework a rise in crime with respect to these three types of crime is
5 The category ‘property crimes’ is taken as an indicator for subsistence crime and addiction-related crime
and is defined in a broad sense; it includes some property crimes with a violent component. It entails:
‘theft’, ‘theft with burglary’, ‘theft with violence’, ‘conning’, ‘extortion’, ‘receiving’, ‘counterfeiting’, and
‘embezzlement’. Theft and theft with burglary make up the large majority of the cases in this category
(about 80%).
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expected when the alternative explanations are controlled for, and not so much with
respect the category ‘other crimes’.
For every year since 1997—the first year for which reliable digital data were
available—the number of suspects for each of the four types of crime were totalled.
The analyses were also done at the apprehension level, yielding similar results, which
will not be presented here. The analyses were limited to migrants from countries that
were, at the time, non-EU countries, including Poland (EU member since 2004) and
Bulgaria (EU member since 2007). The data for the first three quarters of 2003 were
extrapolated to the year as a whole by multiplying all 2003 figures with 12/9.
The methods to control for the alternative explanations are straightforward. When
controlling for reclassification and criminal migration, all crime suspects with indications
for status reclassification or criminal migration were excluded successively from the annual
totals. The policing explanation was examined by comparing the trends on crime suspects
with irregular residence status to the general trends in documented crime in theNetherlands.
The demographic thesis was examined by comparing the developments in the number of
crime suspects with irregular residence status to the (estimated) size and composition of the
irregular population as a whole. Operationalisations are dealt with below.
Our indicator for status reclassification is the sum of all crime suspects in the VAS
in the period 1997–2003 concerning persons (1) who have been declared undesirable
aliens in these years, (2) who applied in vain for a residence permit and/or lost this
permit in the period examined due to criminal activities, without being declared
undesirable aliens, or (3) who have been apprehended as undesirable aliens in these
years but were not declared undesirable aliens in this period (but apparently earlier).
In about 55% of the apprehended irregular immigrants the police registered an arrival
date in the Netherlands. For persons who initially stayed legally in the Netherlands the
arrival date is often known because of previous contacts with the authorities. For persons
who are have been apprehended more than once as ‘irregular aliens’, the first appre-
hension date is often registered as the arrival date. In other instances the police rely on
statements by the arrestee about the arrival date if these are deemed sufficiently reliable.
A suspect was classified under criminal migration or cross-border crime, if (s)he
committed at least one felony within 3 months after arrival in the Netherlands. The
underlying assumption is that this type of offending takes place soon after arrival, while
offending in response to marginalisation tends to develop more gradually. This too is a
fairly broad operationalisation. Different time periods were experimented with, varying
from 1 month to 6 months, which yielded substantively similar results.
Validity
Irregular immigration is an inherently difficult subject for empirical research (Cornelius,
1982). Over the years it has become clear that quantitative data sources can yield
valuable results, particularly of the findings are supplemented with qualitative field
research, as has been done in Dutch research since the 1990s. The VAS data used in the
present article already provided valuable insights on the criminal involvement among
irregular immigrants [24, 37, 38, 57] and on the spatial distribution of irregular
residence in the Netherlands [25, 40].
It has often been argued that police data are problematic for scientific purposes.
There is, for instance, a substantial quantity of crime that never shows up in police
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files. This ‘dark number’ can be reduced by using self-report studies, but for irregular
immigrants this is unrealistic. Two main sources of bias are relevant here. First,
attention of law enforcers commonly concentrates on strategic sites, such as train
stations or crime-ridden areas, as well as on lower-status neighbourhoods. As irreg-
ular immigrants tend to be concentrated in deprived urban neighbourhoods with
elevated crime rates [38], they may have a higher likelihood to be stopped by the
police if they engage in crime there. The second source of bias pertains to the possible
selectivity of police data with respect to racial minorities and immigrants.
Both biasesmay inflate the representation of irregular immigrants in documented crime
in comparison with native and higher status groups. Fortunately, the implications of
these biases were limited in this study. The development over time in the number of
crime suspects within the irregular population is of primary interest here. Moreover, it
could be examined whether the police have become increasingly selective towards
immigrants–regardless of legal status–by comparing the trend data on irregular
immigrants with police data on legal immigrants with similar national backgrounds.
In sum, police data have their drawbacks, but are nonetheless an important data
source to study patterns of criminal activity among irregular immigrants, in particular
when problems of selectivity and bias are taken into account as is attempted here [55].
Testing the alternative explanations
Table 1 starts with an overview of crime suspects. In 1997 the police registered 3,170
crime suspects with irregular status. In 2003 this figure had more than doubled to
7,337 (2003 index: 231). The table also includes figures on suspect rates, i.e. the
percentage of the population that is registered as a suspect annually. This is done for
irregular immigrants and for comparable immigrants with legal status. To calculate
irregular immigrants’ suspect rate Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s estimates of the total
irregular population were used [18]. Note that during the 1990s the suspect rate
among irregular immigrants was considerably lower than among legal non-Western
immigrants, which confirms the deterrence thesis. In later years, however, it increas-
ingly equals the suspect rate among legal migrants, particularly when compared to the
first generation.
Reclassification
It turns out that a substantial number of reclassified immigrants are among the
irregular immigrants apprehended from crimes: they represent about 3,300 crime
suspects in the VAS data.6 Thus, in order to control for the effects of status reclas-
sification all cases involving ‘reclassified’ suspects were subtracted from the annual
totals (Table 2, Control 1). In doing so, it is found that the increase in status
reclassification explains about 6% of the rise in registered crime: whereas for all
cases the crime index in 2003 was 231 (Table 1), it is 223 when only the non-
reclassified cases are taken into consideration ((231–223)*100/(231–100) ≈ 6%).
6 It appears that about one third of these pertain to status reclassification before 1997: these suspects were
apprehended as an undesirable alien between 1997 and 2003, but were not reclassified in these years.
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Criminal migration and cross-border crime
In the period 1997/2003 37% of all irregular immigrants apprehended for
crimes were suspected of committing at least one crime within 3 months of
arrival (Table 3). This percentage is probably an overestimation of the actual share of
criminal migration and cross-border crime in the Netherlands: the date of arrival is
Table 2 Crime suspects among irregular (non-EU) migrants controlling for alternative hypotheses
(1997–2003)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
After control 1 (reclassification)
Property crimes 1,168 1,184 1,267 1,454 1,798 2,537 2,765
False documents 481 515 471 1,275 1,892 1,909 1,677
Drugs 658 650 528 478 629 1,022 1,171
Other crimes 796 811 817 801 823 1,058 1,295
Any crime 3,069 3,115 3,048 3,970 5,098 6,443 6,840
Index 100 101 99 129 166 210 223
After control 2 (criminal migration and cross-border crime)
Property crimes 936 925 939 1,043 1,220 1,817 2,069
False documents 311 358 204 495 688 841 715
Drugs 296 339 312 333 320 457 567
Other crimes 734 708 732 668 612 839 1,055
Any crime 2,246 2,289 2,157 2,508 2,808 3,880 4,352
Index 100 102 96 112 125 173 194
After control 3 (policing)
Property crimes 936 925 930 1,033 1,162 1,594 1,669
False documents 311 358 202 490 655 738 577
Drugs 296 339 309 330 305 401 457
Other crimes 734 708 725 661 583 736 851
Any crime 2,246 2,289 2,136 2,483 2,674 3,404 3,510
Index 100 102 95 111 119 152 156
After control 4 (demographic developments)
Property crimes 936 974 1,257 1,215 1,107 1,398 1,464
False documents 311 377 273 576 624 647 506
Drugs 296 357 418 388 290 352 401
Other crimes 734 745 980 778 555 646 746
Any crime 2,246 2,409 2,886 2,921 2,547 2,986 3,079
Index 100 107 128 130 113 133 137
a Extrapolated figures on the basis of data until October 1st
b These figures are calculated, based on the assumption that Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s estimation for
2003 would be the same as for 2002
Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem, 1997–October 2003; Immigration and Naturalisation Service Data
(IND); CBS Statline (http://statline.cbs.nl; online data by the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS)
visited April 2007)
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more likely to be registered in case of an apprehension at the border than in case of an
apprehensions within the country after irregular settlement has taken place (a regis-
tered arrival date is necessary in order to calculate the duration of stay).
The proportion of criminal migration and cross-border crime differs per type of crime
as specified in Table 3. Three types of crimes stand out: drug-trafficking, false docu-
ments, and aggravated property crimes. Of all suspects of drug trafficking 81% have
been suspected of committing a crime (drug-trafficking or any other type of crime)
within 3 months of arrival. For false documents this percentage is 56. The share of
criminal migration and cross-border crime is also somewhat elevated among property
crimes with burglary or violence, particularly among Eastern Europeans (40%).
To what extent do criminal migration and cross-border crime explain the rise in the
number of crime suspects with irregular status? This was researched by subtracting all
crime suspects who have been suspected of committing a crime before 3 months of
stay from the annual totals that have remained after control 1. As a result, the crime
index for 2003 dropped further from 223 to 194 (Table 2), suggesting that criminal
Table 3 Crime suspects without legal status (non-EU), apprehended before 3 months after arrival,
1997–2003a
Aggravated
property
crimes
Other
property
crimes
False
documents
Drug-
trafficking
Drugs
other
Other
crimes
Any
crime
N % b N % b N % b N % b N % b N % b N % b
1997 136 20 98 17 170 35 16 50 346 54 77 9 840 26
1998 151 23 112 19 157 30 19 33 295 48 111 13 840 26
1999 180 26 163 24 269 57 22 48 224 42 99 11 943 29
2000 220 30 210 25 780 61 6 55 252 40 153 17 1,609 37
2001 338 35 267 28 1,209 64 30 58 498 58 256 25 2,578 46
2002 437 31 332 24 1,069 56 504 90 238 33 267 20 2,816 39
2003b 373 26 339 22 964 57 376 85 257 32 272 17 2,555 35
1997–2003b 1,717 29 1,436 24 4,600 56 973 81 2,054 45 1,213 17 11,844 37
of which:
Europe
(non-EU)
1,358 40 990 32 1,342 56 75 75 303 26 520 26 4,616 40
Africa 189 12 263 14 1,654 53 273 74 679 33 386 13 3,333 30
Asia (incl.
Turkey)
81 17 126 19 1,099 57 70 87 224 40 223 15 1,802 36
Latin-
America
60 16 48 12 493 67 524 85 778 64 61 12 1,943 52
Other non-EU
countries
2 7 9 19 – – 31 100 70 74 23 30 146 49
a Figures for 2003 were extrapolated on the basis of data until October 1st
b The cells in these columns indicate which percentage of the suspects of this crime type have been
suspected of committing at least one crime within 3 months of stay (not necessarily the same crime or
type of crime)
Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem, 1997–October 2003
Crime among irregular immigrants and internal border control
migration and cross-border crime may explain about 22% of the total increase ((223–
194)*100/(231–100) 0 22%). It should be noted that part of this 22% probably
reflects increased policing of false documents at the border.
Policing
According to Statistics Netherlands, the number of crime suspects increased with
24% in the legal population (citizens and legal non-citizens) between 1997 and
2003.7 Between 1997 and 2003 the Dutch population grew by approximately 5%.
Thus, it is not unlikely that the number of criminals may actually have increased in
the legal population. Yet, in order to subject the marginalisation thesis to a critical test
it was assumed that the increase in the number of crime suspects with legal status has
only been caused by changes in policing. Therefore, the crime indexes for irregular
immigrants were recalculated so that possible general developments in policing are
kept constant. This was done by dividing the relative number of irregular crime
suspects for a given year by the relative number of legal crime suspects for that year
compared to 1997. In other words, the number of suspects in 1997 who remained
after control 2 was divided by one, the number of suspects in 2001 by 1.05 (between
1997 and 2001 the number of suspects increased with 5%), the number of suspects for
2003 by 1.24, and so on.
As a result of this third control, the 2003 crime index for irregular immigrants
dropped further from 196 to 156. Thus, although general developments in policing
may account for a significant part of the rise in registered crime among irregular
immigrants (about 29%) the rise in the number of ‘illegal’ crime suspects is still
considerably steeper than in the legal population.
It is possible that the police have paid more attention to ethnic minorities and
immigrants between 1997 and 2003. Yet, this is not confirmed by the data that have
already been presented in Table 1. If there would have been a question of increased
selectivity towards ethnic minorities a rise in the suspect rate among immigrants
would be expected, regardless of legal status. This is, however, not the case: the
suspect rate among legal migrants has not increased between 1997 and 2003.
Finally, the police may have deployed more resources over time to trace identity
fraud by irregular immigrants and to target criminal irregular immigrants, for
instance in Amsterdam. To control for this all known cases concerning false docu-
ments were excluded–not just the cases that were already excluded in the second
control. Due to this additional control, the crime index for 2003 only dropped
marginally from 156 to 154 (figures not in table). When the apprehensions in
Amsterdam were excluded in addition, the crime index for 2003 actually increased
somewhat.
It should be reported that the number of crime suspects with illegal status also
increased in comparison to the number of irregular migrants apprehended for illegal
residence, illegal labour, and common misdemeanours (this was already mentioned in
the introduction). This is an additional indication that the rise in crime does not
merely reflect a tendency to apprehend more irregular migrants.
7 Source: CBS Statline (http://statline.cbs.nl, visited April 2007).
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In conclusion, the rise in crime under study does not appear to be due to changes in
how the police dealt with immigrants in general and irregular immigrants in partic-
ular–apart from increased tracing of false documents at the border–but 29% may be
linked with general changes in policing in the Netherlands.
Demographic changes
Finally, the rise in the number of crime suspects may have been caused by changes in
the composition of the irregular population, or its size.
Some idea about the possible impact of the composition of the irregular population
can be obtained by looking at the demographic characteristics of all apprehended
irregular immigrants, including migrants who have been apprehended for non-crim-
inal reasons. We find that the rise in crime does not appear to be the result of a steep
rise in the number of illegally residing males or youngsters. The share of males
increased only marginally from 79% in 1997 to 81% in 2003, and the average age
rose from 28.8 to 29.7 in this period. Finally, the rise in the number of crime suspects
with irregular status may be related to developments in the size of the irregular
population in the Netherlands. Figure 1 shows the development of the estimated size
of the irregular population since 1997, using Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s
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Fig. 1 Relative developments in the estimated undocumented population from Eastern Europe and other
non-EU countries. Notes: a Cruyff and Van der Heijden’s estimations of the size of the irregular European
population include (a minority) of irregular Western-Europeans who have been declared undesirable aliens.
Sources: Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem, 1997–2002; Estimations taken from [18, pp. 38–39]
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calculations, which include separate estimations for Europeans and non-Europeans
[18]. The estimations for 1997 have been set at 100. Whereas the number of non-
European irregular immigrants was more or less stable or decreasing somewhat, the
estimated number of irregular immigrants from Eastern Europe has increased. After
2001 there may have been a small net increase in the total irregular population, i.e.
Europeans and non-Europeans combined. Still, this increase is clearly less substantial
than the increase in the number of crime suspects that remained after control 3.
The figures in Table 2 after control 3 were adjusted for the estimated changes in
the size of the irregular population in the same way as was done for control 3. The
number of non-European crime suspects for 2002 was, for example, divided by 0.83,
whereas the number of European crime suspects was divided by 1.55. (The estima-
tions for 2002 were used to adjust the figures for 2003, because no estimation for
2003 was available).8 As a result, the suspect rate for 2003 dropped somewhat further
from 156 to 137, which is still considerably higher than hundred (Table 2). Note also
that the results after control 4 show an increase in property crimes, false documents
and drugs–i.e. the indicators for subsistence and drug-related crimes –, but not for the
category ‘other crimes’. This constitutes additional evidence for the marginalisation
thesis.
Conclusion
In this article the marginalisation thesis—the idea that internal border control of the
type that was implemented in the Netherlands may generate crime among those
individuals who do not leave the country–was subjected to a critical examination,
taking the Netherlands as a test case. It becomes clear that a combination of factors
has contributed to the observed rise in crime suspects with irregular status. We find
that general developments in policing and police registration may account for 29% of
the increase, whereas criminal migration and cross-border crime account for 22%.
Demographic growth (15%) and status reclassification (6%) appear to have been less
influential. In our analysis, marginalisation effects are responsible for the remaining
part, i.e. 28% of the increase.9 This may be taken as a conservative estimate because
the alternative explanations were systematically favoured in the analyses over the
marginalisation thesis.
The main conclusion is, therefore, that the increase in internal border control by
means of excluding irregular immigrants from the formal labour market and public
provisions has heightened criminal involvement as an unintended side-effect, pre-
dominantly in the form of fostering subsistence crime and drug-related crime.
To make the effects of marginalisation more tangible, it can be calculated that
marginalisation as a result of the intensification of internal control in the Netherlands
8 The number of non-European crime suspects for 2002 was, for example, divided by 0.83, whereas the
number of European crime suspects was divided by 1.55. The estimations for 2002 were used to adjust the
figures for 2003, because no estimation for 2003 was available.
9 The relative increase between 1997 and 2003 is 131 (231–100). Of this, status reclassification explains
8 (231–223), criminal migration 29 (223–194), general developments in crime finding and registration 38
(194–156), and demographic growth 19 (156–137). These figures are approximations also because the
order of the controls influences the outcomes to some extent.
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may have led to at least 3,000 additional crime suspects between 1997 and 2003.10
For irregular immigrants this development is significant. Their chances of becoming
involved in subsistence and/or drug-related crime appear to have increased, on
average, by at least 37% between 1997 and 2003 (this is not the same as 28% of
the increase being explained by marginalisation effects, see note).11 Furthermore, the
total criminogenic effects of internal border control are probably somewhat stronger,
because the alternative explanations were operationalised according to broad criteria
and irregular immigrants were already excluded from the formal labour market in the
Netherlands in 1991, 6 years before this study’s starting point.
Having said that, the increase is limited compared to crime problems in the
Netherlands in general. The additional 3,000 crime suspects equal 0.15% of the
suspects in the legal population between 1997 and 2003. Although irregular immi-
grants appear to have become overrepresented in crime statistics in recent years, their
criminal activities still account for a very small part of all crimes committed in the
Netherlands.
A theoretical implication of the findings is that in order to understand immigrant
crime today, researchers should pay attention to the ways in which states embrace or
exclude migrants. Intensified regulation constitutes, more or less by definition, new
forms of legality and therefore, by implication, of illegality, such as entering a country
without valid papers or not reporting to the aliens police after arrival. Moreover, this
article showed that there are complex relations between internal border control and
‘conventional’ crime such as theft and violence. While the threat of exclusion from
the national territory may depress suspect rates via the criminological mechanism of
deterrence and social control, exclusion from the labour market and public provisions
seems to increase the likelihood of certain criminal responses via the criminological
mechanism of strain. The latter type of internal control incites certain criminal
responses as it increases the likelihood of migrants being unable to support them-
selves in conventional ways [1, 47]. This is an ideal-typical distinction: internal
control of the first type may activate mechanisms that tend to be associated with
the second type. For example, traffic checks are a form of internal control of the first
type that is increasingly common in some localities in the US, which may foster
subsistence crime indirectly if they reduce employment opportunities by reducing
commuting opportunities.
Our findings are in line with the tenor of the literature on crimmigration and the
securitisation of migration: the expansion of border control brings about a stronger
association between illegal residence and crime. We also agree that this association is
partly the result of policies and practices of redefinition, reclassification, and policing.
However, we have tried to go a step further by showing that constructivist approaches
risk missing an important part of the picture: it is not only the discourse, the law and
10 The development in the number of crime suspects after control 4b was compared to the hypothetical
situation in which the number of such suspects would have remained stable ((Δ 0 2,409–2,246) + (2,886–
2,246) + (3,079–2,246) 0 3,352).
11 The increase is 37% (137 vs. 100) if we assume that all the crime suspects who remain after control 4b
can be explained under the marginalisation thesis. The increase is higher if these remaining crimes have, in
part, other backgrounds that are unconnected to state policies (such as ‘honour violence’). For instance the
increase is 48% if in every year 500 crime suspects offended because of such reasons ((3,079–500)/(2,246–
500) 0 1.48).
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the behaviour of law enforcement agencies that may change, but also the behaviour of
migrants.
A second addition is that, from a constructivist perspective, the criminalisation of
migrants seems to have been intended by governments, as it performs various
positive functions for the state (such as legitimising the introduction of new surveil-
lance techniques, or maintaining popular support in the face of increasing socio-
economic uncertainly). Yet by and large, the rise in crime among irregular migrants in
the Netherlands seems to have been an unintended and undesired side-effect of state
intervention. For example, there is now a significant group of vulnerable irregular
migrants in the Netherlands, composed of people who cannot find sufficient employ-
ment and who do not have a family or partner to support them. Many local govern-
ments—faced with the results of restrictive immigration policy in the form of
homeless and criminal irregular migrants on their streets—continue to subsidise
accommodation for certain categories of irregular migrants or even organise accom-
modation themselves. Moreover, the national government has begun to detain sub-
stantial numbers of marginalised irregular migrants in immigration detention, often
repeatedly, to manage public safety problems [39].
At the same time, right-wing parties are inclined to use police information and
media reports about the increased representation of irregular immigrants in crime
statistics to legitimise even more restrictive immigration policies. For example, in
2008 two major right wing parties introduced a resolution to make illegal residence a
felony, in which they argued that illegal residence ‘will have to be deterred much
more effectively because it causes major problems for Dutch society, for example
with respect to safety […]’. The resolution was rejected, but the present centre-right
government does intend to make illegal residence punishable as an offence, although
it remains to be seen if this is feasible within the European Union. Thus, all in all,
what seems to have occurred in the Netherlands is that a discourse in which illegal
residence was framed as a socio-economic threat has been replaced by a discourse in
which it is portrayed as a threat to public safety.
Although the effects of internal border control were central in this article, the
analysis also pointed to unintended repercussions of open external borders. If free
movement of legal goods and certain persons is promoted, as is done as part of the
project of European integration, it is also easier for criminals to migrate to other
countries to commit crimes like drug trafficking or aggravated theft (this does not
imply that such phenomena will occur with high frequency, as is sometimes sug-
gested by certain media reports). This is the more likely if there are large economic
disparities between the countries involved. In such circumstances, relatively closed
and relatively open societies may foster specific forms of immigrant crime.
The findings are highly relevant for policy making in the field of irregular
residence. The United States have traditionally focused more on controlling its
external physical borders [3, 43], whereas Scandinavian countries, Germany and
France, for example, have also put much more emphasis on guarding their labour
market and public provisions [17, 19, 21, 27, 30]. In spite of these national differ-
ences, there is an apparent tendency in most countries to exclude irregular immigrants
from the labour market and public provisions. In 2009, for instance, the European
Commission enacted Council Directive 2009/52, which provides for sanctions
against employers of illegally staying third country nationals. A recent international
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comparison of Spain, Italy, Greece, Austria, France, Germany, the UK and the
Netherlands also led to the conclusion that “controls within these countries have
intensified in the last 4–5 years” [15: 125]. The United States has adopted such
policies of internal control as well, including stricter law-enforcement. This is done,
for example, though the federal program E-Verify, which checks the residence status
of workers. Since 2005 in particular, policies of internal border control have also been
implemented at the level of individual states. In the past few years, the majority of
American states have adopted measures to curb employment and residence by
irregular immigrants via more severe employer sanctions, decreased access to ID’s,
the denial of state contracts to companies working with irregular immigrants, or by
excluding irregular immigrants from public benefits [see also [33, 49, 63]]. There are
now four states where e-verify is mandatory for all employers, as well as eight states
where e-verify is mandatory for state employers and/or contractors.12
Research in other countries may provide additional evidence for the mechanisms
that were central in this article or find different outcomes in different settings. In
countries with a larger informal economy and a larger private housing market, for
instance, a shift to informal practices may be more likely than a shift towards crime.
Moreover, in federations such as the US it may be relatively easy for irregular
immigrants to leave states with strict internal controls, and move to relatively
permissive states. But although the Dutch case may be specific in certain respects,
it unequivocally points to the need of taking into account the intended and unintended
consequences of immigration policies, as well as to the need of paying attention to
external and internal border control in the study of immigration and crime.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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